# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must advocate a policy whereby the United States federal government expands the scope of one or more of its core antitrust laws.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases ’64 [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law ‘4 [Black’s Law Dictionary; 6/1/4; 8th Edition, p. 716]

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### Should means mandating something be done.

Nieto ‘9 [Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)]

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### Prohibitions are legal restrictions against certain conduct.

DLD ‘ND [Duhaime's Law Dictionary; “Prohibition Definition”; http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prohibition.aspx; AS]

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman, FTC, and Clayton Acts.

CoC ‘ND [Chamber of Commerce; “Antitrust Laws”; https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws; AS]

America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation.

The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

#### Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.

#### Vote neg:

#### First is procedural fairness – their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side.

#### Second is clash – you should privilege rigorous debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

### 1NC – Market Metaphors K

#### Neoliberalism relies on the discourse of competitive markets. Using metaphors like “refusal to deal” and “monopolizing education” to conceptualize debate re-makes political speech in terms of free market ideology.

PW. **ZUIDHOF** European Political Economy @ Amsterdam **’12** *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism* p. 7-11

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### The concept of a competitive marketplace of ideas naturalizes free market ideology.

Thomas **JOO** Law @ UC Davis **’14** The Worst Test of Truth: The Marketplace of Ideas as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383 (2014). p. 386-389

IV. Conclusion

As every grade-school English student learns, a metaphor is a figure of speech stating that one thing "is" another. Metaphors can work considerable mischief when that equation is taken literally. First Amendment jurisprudence takes literally the metaphorical statement that speech "is" a market. That is, rather than merely drawing figurative parallels between public discourse and economic markets, it collapses them into a single concept called "markets." 319Link to the text of the note This literalization of the legal metaphor has been helped along by economic analyses of law and policy, which have insisted that nearly all forms of social activity are literally economic markets. 320Link to the text of the note

At the same time that the scope of "market" has been expanding, the scope of "speech" protected under the First Amendment has been expanding as well. Justice Holmes and Justice Brennan cleverly deployed market rhetoric when it fit the zeitgeist of the Lochner and Cold War eras. More recently, it has been argued, corporations and business interests have turned the tables and displayed similar rhetorical "opportunism" by reframing their economic rights arguments in the more appealing language of the First Amendment. 321Link to the text of the note A long line of campaign finance cases, culminating most recently in Citizens United, has treated spending in support of candidates as speech, regardless of the identity of the spender. Commercial speech, once considered outside the First Amendment, enjoys considerable [\*432] constitutional protection. The First Amendment also protects nonverbal conduct; it "does not end at the spoken or written word." 322Link to the text of the note

If everything is a market, and everything is speech, then everything is both market and speech, and the two categories are literally coterminous - but so broad as to be meaningless. If everything is a market, and markets should not be regulated, then nothing - neither speech nor anything else - should be regulated. As markets and speech (and everything else) collapse into a single notion, the "marketplace of ideas" rhetoric is no longer specifically about any of the values involved in free speech theory, such as expressive rights, listeners' interests, preventing government suppression of dissent, or the search for "truth" (whether normative or empirical). Nor is it about any of the important functions of markets, such as efficient allocation of resources or setting prices to reflect demand. It is simply antiregulatory. Skepticism of government is of course consistent with a long and fundamental libertarian tradition in Anglo-American thought. But the metaphor is more than skeptical. Because it lacks insights into how to limit regulation, it reduces to free-market and free-speech absolutism.

Furthermore, the marketplace of ideas metaphor advances an argument that fails on its own terms. It purports to be an instrumental theory based on the observed characteristics of markets - that is, it argues that speech deregulation will produce a good (i.e., "truth") in the way that unregulated markets allegedly do. But market processes do not produce truth, and the law polices markets vigorously for this very reason. There are of course many reasons to be skeptical of government regulation of both speech and of markets, but those reasons are specific to the distinct institutions of speech and those of economic markets. By claiming to identify "truth" as a shared reason for deregulating speech and markets, the marketplace metaphor ignores the actual, valuable functions of both speech and markets.

The marketplace rhetoric also illuminates the use of metaphor in legal argument and elsewhere. As this Article has argued, metaphors are often normative assertions disguised as reasoned analogical arguments. While a metaphor purports to use our knowledge about one phenomenon (such as "markets") to provide insights into a second phenomenon (such as "speech"), it is actually making arguments about [\*433] both the first and second phenomena. 323Link to the text of the note That is, the marketplace metaphor not only advances the assertion that speech should be unregulated like markets, but also tacitly advances the unexamined assertion that markets themselves should be unregulated.

#### The extension of market relations throughout society threatens ecological and social collapse.

Richard B. **NORGAARD** Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group @ Cal Berkeley ’**19** “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87 p. 124-127

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

**Market metaphors cannot be re-appropriated by the disempowered. Even if the content of their political program explicitly questions market values, the form of market metaphors re-packages everything as commodifiable assets.**

Kip Austin **HINTON** Language, Literacy, and Intercultural Studies @ UT Brownsville **’15** “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color” *Equity & Excellence in Education* 48 (2) p. 307-310

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly no- table that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff(2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Ko ̈vecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to charac- terize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capital- related social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance- related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seem- ingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market con- cerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher push- out rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solo ́rzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldu ́a’s (1990) call for a more empowering theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### We must reject economic metaphors in advocating for social justice. New frameworks based on resistance and trust can build alternatives to social capital in the marketplace of ideas.

Kip Austin **HINTON** Language, Literacy, and Intercultural Studies @ UT Brownsville **’15** “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color” *Equity & Excellence in Education* 48 (2) p. 312-313

CONCLUSION

While not fully-formed, the possibilities above—resistance, trust, spirituality, love—have the potential to help us better understand cultural and social phenomena. None of these alone can explain or account for everything, but a single idea doesn’t need to. It may be possible to deploy these concepts in limited ways or in combination. They may work best within existing frameworks or in concert with new ideas, yet to be theorized. Unlike metaphorical capital, resistance, trust, spirituality, and love are concepts that do not diminish through usage, and are not as readily quantifiable. Although I acknowledge the value of quantitative data to government agencies, I nonetheless urge a move away from quasi-economic interpretations of the culture of communities of color. There is a reason economists never presume that cultural expression will help them understand monetary policy: Culture and economics are starkly different realms of human experience. Just because something is good does not mean it should be called capital (Cohen & Prusak, 2001). Though frequently expressed in material ways, culture transcends the material world. Cultures can survive in our imagination; cultures divide or combine into unexpected hybrids. Resistance, trust, spirituality, and love could offer viable frameworks or metaphors to explain culture, in a more effective and humane way.

Every day since 2011, Occupy Wall Street protestors have been arguing that capital should not shape government policy (Hardt & Negri, 2011); within education research, I am arguing that capital should not shape our analysis of culture. Non-metaphorical capital has harmed poor communities of color, in the form of language loss, environmental destruction, and coerced assimilation (M. Smith, Ryoo, & McLaren, 2009). This has enacted an “unprecedented and extremely rapid transfer of wealth from the poorest strata of society to the richest” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 215). By moving on to new frameworks and abandoning capital, social justice researchers will better serve those who are exploited under capitalism. Even if the four possibilities here are not viable, there may be another alternative, not yet recognized. It remains that capital and wealth impose an inaccurate, neoliberal framework. I hope to spur dialogue that leads to a new model. Researchers need a non-financial way to understand the cultural and social relationships of communities of color.

**Market language colonizes our lifeworld. Including any part of the aff’s metaphorical use of economic competition crowds out social relationships.**

Maria **HUMPHRIES** Waikato Management School @ University of Waikato **AND** Suzanne **GRANT** Waikato Management School @ University of Waikato **‘5** “Social Enterprise and Re-Civilization of Human Endeavors: Re-Socializing the Market Metaphor or Encroaching Colonization of the Lifeworld?” *Current Issues in Comparative Education* 8(1) p. 45-46

Of Markets and the Lifeworld

Habermas introduces the distinction between "the life world" and "the system" to focus of the differing ways social cohesion may be fostered (Ingram, 1987, p. 115). "The life world" is the sphere in which social relationships form the binding/bonding processes of communities. It is the world of magic and metaphor, of emotions, and of varied forms of articulating entitlement and the caretaking responsibilities of one for another and the earth. "The system" refers to the economic and bureaucratic practices that characterize contemporary western societies. In this sphere, the binding/bonding effect is intended to be met through largely mechanistic or instrumental arrangements we refer to as "the market." The "contract" is its most articulated vehicle. In western society, argues Habermas, what is left of "the life world" is being encroached by the logic of "the system." He calls this encroachment "colonization." We can see this most explicitly when we look at the transformation of various care-taking responsibilities from families to professional service providers who win and serve "contracts" in health care and disability services, education, eldercare, and so much more. Habermas has some concerns about this colonization that we share:

To the degree that the economic system subjects the life-forms of private households and the life conduct of consumers and employees to its imperatives, consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance, and competition gain the force to shape behavior... (Habermas, 1987, p. 325).

Working in, and responding to, the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Habermas developed a concern for emancipation particularly in response to Adorno and Horkheimer and their deeply pessimistic view of contemporary western society (Edgar and Sedgwick, 2002, p. 275). Critical theorists, in this tradition often link the predominant ways in which power is formulated and institutionalized in these societies to the exacerbation of the problems humanity must address. They want to do this in a way that generates emancipatory change (Carr, 2000, p. 208). From a transformational perspective, this is to make a contribution to the emancipation of humanity, the creation of just societies and the responsible stewardship of the earth. The ideas, the hope and the inspiration that are needed for the deep transformation of western society are more likely to emerge from the lifeworld than from "the system." Subjecting the life world to the logic of the system is thus likely to dry up the very source of creativity needed for such transformation. Enlarging the group of people that are committed to developing the character traits Dees describes, would be a marvelous contribution that educators could make.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Case

#### Vote neg on presumption – voting aff cannot resolve any of the “anticompetitive” procedures they have identified – ballots only signal the winner and loser, it’s not a referendum on what practices the community needs to change.

#### Resiliency turn:

#### The 1ac's strategy employs a politics of resilience that transforms objectification into a form of subjectification. The bouncing-back or "livedness" of oppressed subjects creates the possibility for intervention and invests in a globalized system of Multi-Racial White Supremacist Patriarchy.

James 15

(Robin James- Associate Professor of Philosophy @ UNC Charlotte, Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Publisher: Zero Books, p. 88-92)//TR

Resilience must be performed explicitly, legibly, and spectacularly. Overcoming is necessary but insufficient; to count and function as resilience, this overcoming must be accomplished in a visible or otherwise legible and consumable manner. Overcoming is a type of “affective labor” which, as Steven Shaviro puts it, “is productive only to the extent that it is a public performance. It cannot unfold in the hidden depths; it must be visible and audible” (PCA 49n33) In order to tune into feminine resilience and feed it back into its power supply, MRWaSP has to perceive it as such. “Look,! Overcame!” is the resilient subject’s maxim or mantra. Gender and race have always been “visible identities,” to use philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff’s term, identities strongly tied to one’s outward physical appearance. However, gendered/racialized resilience isn’t visible in the same way that conventional gender and racial identities are visible. To clarify these differences, it’s helpful to think of resilience in terms of a “Look, I overcame!” imperative. “Look, I Overcame!” Is easy to juxtapose to Frantz Fanon’s “Look a Negro!”, which is the touch stone for his analysis of gendered racialization in “The Fact of Blackness.” In both cases, looking is a means of crafting race/gender identities and distributing white patriarchal privilege. But, in the same way that resilience discourse “upgrades” traditional methods for crafting identities and distributing privilege, the “looking” in “Look, I Overcame’” is an upgrade on the “looking” in “Look, a Negro” According to Fanon, the exclamation “Look, a Negro!” racializes him as a black man. To be “a Negro” is to be objectified by the white supremacist gaze. This gaze fixes him as an object, rather than an ambiguous transcendence (which is a more nuanced way of describing the existentialist concept of subjectivity). “The black man,” as Fanon argues, “has no ontological resistance for the white man” (BSWM 110) because, as an object and not a mutually-recognized subject, he cannot return the white man’s gaze (“The Look” that is so important to Sartre’s theory of subjectivity in Being & Nothingness). The LIO narrative differs from Fanon’s account in the same way it differs from Iris Young’s account of feminine body comportment: in resilience discourse, objectification isn’t an end but a means, any impediment posed by the damage wrought by the white/male gaze Is a necessary prerequisite for subjectivity, agency, and mutual recognition. In other words, being looked at isn’t an impediment, but a resource. Resilience discourse turns objectification (being looked at) into a means of subjectificatlon (overcoming). It also makes looking even more efficient and profitable than simple objectification could ever be. Recognizing and affirming the affective labor of the resilient performer, the spectator feeds the performer’s individual overcoming Into a second-order therapeutic narrative: our approbation of her overcoming is evidence of our own overcoming of our past prejudices. This spectator wants to be seen by a wider audience as someone who answers the resilient feminine subject’s hail, “Look, I Overcame’. Just as individual feminine subjects use their resilience as proof of their own goodness, MRWaSP uses the resilience of its “good girls” as proof that they’re the “good guys” — that its social and ethical practices are truly just, and that we really mean it this time when we say everyone is equal. For example, the “resilience” of “our” women is often contrasted with the supposed “fragility” of Third-World women of color. Or, in domestic US race-gender politics, the resilience of some African-American women (their bootstraps-style class ascendance) is contrasted to the continued fragility of other African-American women, and thus used to reinforce class distinctions among blacks. There are a million different versions of this general story: “our” women are already liberated — they saved themselves —but, to riff on Gayatri Spivak, “brown women need saving from brown men.” Most mainstream conversations about Third-World women are versions of this story: discussions of “Muslim” veiling, female circumcision, sweatshops, poverty ‘development.” they’re all white-saviorist narratives meant to display MRWaSP’s own resilience. Look, I Overcame!” upgrades ‘Look, a Negro’ by (a) recycling objectification into overcoming and (b) compounding looking, so that one can profit from others’ resilience, treating their overcoming as one’s own overcoming. This upgrade in white supremacist patriarchy requires a concomitant upgrade in looking.” This shift in looking practices parallels developments in film and media aesthetics. As Steven Shaviro has argued, the values, techniques, and compositional strategies most common in contemporary mainstream Western cinema — like Michael Bay’s Transformers—are significantly different than the ones used in modernist and post-modernist cinema, and that these differences in media production correlate to broader shifts in the means of capitalist and ideological production. Neoliberalism’s aesthetic is, he argues, “post-cinematic.” This post-cinematic aesthetic applies not just to film and media, but to resilience discourse. Its performance practices and looking relations configured by the “Look. I Overcame!” imperative, resilience is, in a way, another type of post-cinematic medium. In the next section I use Shaviro’s theory of post-cinematic media to identify some specific ways in which traditional patriarchal tools are updated to work compatibly with MRWaSP resilience discourse. The looking in the “Look, I Overcame!” narrative is not the same kind of looking described by concepts like “the male gaze” or “controlling images” This looking is a type of deregulated MRWaSP visualization.

#### There’s a difference between self-work and self-care, resilience and survival – the aff recuperates the very systems which wage war on the multitude of black bodies

James 14

(Robin James is Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte, ON RESILIENCE & ‘SELF-CARE AS WARFARE’, September 28, 2014, <http://www.its-her-factory.com/2014/09/on-resilience-self-care-as-warfare/)//TR>

I’ve been using the concept of [resilience](http://www.its-her-factory.com/2014/05/oh-bondage-up-yours-resilience-as-feminine-ideal-and-racializing-technology-my-philosophia-2014-talk/) as a way to understand one of these latter methods. (I think self-care is legible as resilience only when subjects occupy specific situations.) What do I mean by ‘resilience’? Well, some women are tasked with the imperative “you must be a survivor.” We’re supposed to Lean In, or show “grit” by learning to code, to rock, to run, or whatever. By overcoming our personal gendered damage, we both (a) show that society has overcome patriarchy, and (b) take out the trash, those individuals/groups who aren’t flexible, adaptable, indeed, resilient enough to keep up with the post-feminist times. Resilience is a means of producing (a) and (b)–it’s a way of organizing society to funnel the profits from this surplus value to privileged people and institutions. This is why resilience is not about personal healing: resilient self-care is just another, upgraded way of instrumentalizing the same people.

Resilience is not actually about your survival; it’s about the survival and health of hegemonic institutions like MRWaSP. It’s a strategy MRWaSP uses to wage its war. Contemporary white supremacist patriarchy “includes” some formerly excluded populations, but they’re included as always in need of remediation, as eternally working on and improving themselves (we’re not “in” yet, just constantly leaning that way). (Just to be clear: individuals can be seen as successfully and finally remediated, but the group as a whole still isn’t completely finished.) This is really convenient for capitalism too, because people’s endless laboring on themselves opens up the personal “disciplines” (what were formerly preconditions for capitalist production, what standardized workers and made them docile cogs in the machine) as sources of surplus value production.

The labor of resilience only seems like self-care because society is structured so that it functions optimally when you (or people like you) succeed. So resilience isn’t about cultivating what you need, it’s about adapting to dominant notions of success. What they say is ‘healthy’ might not actually be healthy, for example. This is self work, but not necessarily self “care.” This sort of work looks and feels like care because its rewards are generally affective, physiological, and personal. It is a kind of “care” labor on the self, but it is not actually “caring” in the sense of 70s feminist care ethics, i.e., of cultivating relationships that support one another. In fact, I think cultivating relationships that support one another–that is, re-organizing society on whatever scale you can to make it more survivable–is one of the best ways to think about refusing the work of resilience. It’s quite similar to what Ahmed describes as “redirecting care away from its proper objects.”

Re-organizing relationships of support and dependence is one thing that happens when workers go on strike. In a well-organized strike, supporters and participants help one another do things that would normally happen as a business transaction, like the provision of food and services. So maybe those of us tasked with the work of resilience should imagine our resistance not as warfare, but as a strike. There’s a difference between surviving a system predicated on your death, and bending the circuits of systems designed to support (a very narrowly drawn model of) your life. In the former case, your survival disrupts systems predicated on your death; in the latter case, refusing to work/generate surplus value diminishes the vitality of the systems that profit from your work.

I think there are some other important differences between resilience and guerilla self-care, differences that make it pretty clear that “an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety” is not “participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up ‘the ladder’” (Ahmed). First, resilience is a specific method for producing human capital, that is, for getting a return on the investments you make in your self-improvement. And to get these returns, your recovery must be spectacular–that is, made into a spectacle consumable (and shareable) by others. Resilience discourse makes a spectacle of the performance of survival. Self-care isn’t resilient self-work unless it’s rendered into human capital, i.e., what gets you “up the ladder.” Second, self-care is an ongoing process. Dealing with trauma can be a lifelong project. Resilience, on the other hand, treats therapeutic overcoming as a resolved accomplishment: I was once damaged, but now I am better. Resilience says “Look, I Overcame” (spectacle + past tense).

#### Calls for deference lead to elite capture.

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room.

I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse.

To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence.

I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed.

To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together.

Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”.

My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on.

It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.

​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted.

But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages.

Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them.

Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.

Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.

But probably not.

A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect.

The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experience. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us.

The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them.

For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them.

The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political.

Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage.

How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.

The water crisis in Flint, Michigan presents a clear example of both the possibilities and limitations of refining our epistemic politics in this way. Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), a government body tasked with the support of “healthy communities”, with a team of fifty trained scientists at its disposal, was complicit in covering up the scale and gravity of the public health crisis from the beginning of the crisis in 2014 until it garnered national attention in 2015.

The MDEQ, speaking from a position of epistemic and political authority, defended the status quo in Flint. They claimed that “Flint water is safe to drink”, and were cited in Flint Mayor Dayne Walling’s statement aiming to “dispel myths and promote the truth about the Flint River” during the April 2014 transition to the Flint River water source. That transition was spearheaded under the tenure of the city’s emergency manager Darnell Earley (an African-American, like many of the city residents he helped to poison). After the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) circulated a leaked internal memo from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in July of 2014 expressing concern about lead in Flint water, the MDEQ produced a doctored report that put the overall measure of lead levels within federally mandated levels by mysteriously failing to count two contaminated samples.

The reaction from residents was immediate. The month after the switch in water source, residents reported that their tap water was discoloured and gave off an alarming odour. They didn’t need their oppression to be “celebrated”, “centred”, or narrated in the newest academic parlance. They didn’t need someone to understand what it felt like to be poisoned. What they needed was the lead out of their water. So they got to work.

The first step was to develop epistemic authority. To achieve this they built a new room: one that put Flint residents and activists in active collaboration with scientists who had the laboratories that could run the relevant tests and prove the MDEQ’s report to be fraudulent. Flint residents’ outcry recruited scientists to their cause and led a “citizen science” campaign, further raising the alarm about the water quality and distributing sample kits to neighbours to submit for testing. In this stage, the alliance of residents and scientists won, and the poisoning of the children of Flint emerged as a national scandal.

But this was not enough. The second step – cleaning the water – required more than state acknowledgement: it required apportioning labour and resources to fix the water and address the continuing health concerns. What Flint residents received, initially, was a mix of platitudes and mockery from the ruling elite (some of this personally committed by a President that shared a racial identity with many of them). This year, however, it looks as though the tireless activism of Flint residents and their expanding list of teammates has won additional and more meaningful victories: the ongoing campaign is pushing the replacements of the problematic service lines to their final stage and is forcing the state of Michigan to agree to a settlement of $600 million for affected families.

This outcome is in no way a wholesale victory: not only will attorney fees cut a substantial portion of payouts, but the settlement cannot undo the damage that was caused to the residents. A constructive epistemology cannot guarantee full victory over an oppressive system by itself. No epistemic orientation can by itself undo the various power asymmetries between the people and the imperial state system. But it can help make the game a little more competitive – and deference epistemology isn’t even playing.

The biggest threats to social justice attention and informational economies are not the absence of yet more jargon to describe, ever more precisely or incisively, the epistemic, attentional, or interpersonal afflictions of the disempowered. The biggest threats are the erosion of the practical and material bases for popular power over knowledge production and distribution, particularly that which could aid effective political action and constrain or eliminate predation by elites. The capture and corruption of these bases by well-positioned elites, especially tech corporations, goes on unabated and largely unchallenged, including: the corporate monopolization of local news, the ongoing destruction and looting of the journalistic profession, the interference of corporations and governments in key democratic processes, and the domination of elite interests in the production of knowledge by research universities and the circulation of the output of these distorted processes by established media organizations.

Confronting these threats requires leaving some rooms – and building new ones.

The constructive approach to standpoint epistemology is demanding. It asks that we swim upstream: to be accountable and responsive to people who aren’t yet in the room, to build the kinds of rooms we could sit in together, rather than merely judiciously navigating the rooms history has built for us. But this weighty demand is par for the course when it comes to the politics of knowledge: the American philosopher Sandra Harding famously pointed out that standpoint epistemology, properly understood, demands more rigour from science and knowledge production processes generally, not less.

But one important topic stands unaddressed. The deferential approach to standpoint epistemology often comes packaged with concern and attention to the importance of lived experience. Among these, traumatic experiences are especially foregrounded.

At this juncture, scholarly analysis and argument fail me. The remainder of what I have to say skews more towards conviction than contention. But the life of books has taught me that conviction has just as much to teach, however differently posed or processed, and so I press on.

I take concerns about trauma especially seriously. I grew up in the United States, a nation structured by settler colonialism, racial slavery, and their aftermath, with enough collective and historical trauma to go round. I also grew up in a Nigerian diasporic community, populated by many who had genocide in living memory. At the national and community level, I have seen a lot of traits of norms, personality, quirks of habit and action that I’ve suspected were downstream of these facts. At the level of individual experience, I’ve watched and felt myself change in reaction to fearing for my dignity or life, to crushing pain and humiliation. I reflect on these traumatic moments often, and very seldom think: “That was educational”.

These experiences can be, if we are very fortunate, building blocks. What comes of them depends on how the blocks are put together: what standpoint epistemologists call the “achievement thesis”. Briana Toole clarifies that, by itself, one’s social location only puts a person in a position to know. “Epistemic privilege” or advantage is achieved only through deliberate, concerted struggle from that position.

I concede outright that this is certainly one possible result of the experience of oppression: have no doubt that humiliation, deprivation, and suffering can build (especially in the context of the deliberate, structured effort of “consciousness raising”, as Toole specifically highlights). But these same experiences can also destroy, and if I had to bet on which effect would win most often, it would be the latter. As Agnes Callard rightly notes, trauma (and even the righteous, well-deserved anger that often accompanies it) can corrupt as readily as it can ennoble. Perhaps more so.

Contra the old expression, pain – whether borne of oppression or not – is a poor teacher. Suffering is partial, short-sighted, and self-absorbed. We shouldn’t have a politics that expects different: oppression is not a prep school.

When it comes down to it, the thing I believe most deeply about deference epistemology is that it asks something of trauma that it cannot give. Demanding as the constructive approach may be, the deferential approach is far more demanding and in a far more unfair way: it asks the traumatized to shoulder burdens alone that we ought to share collectively. When I think about my trauma, I don’t think about grand lessons. I think about the quiet nobility of survival. The very fact that those chapters weren’t the final ones of my story is powerful enough writing all on its own. It is enough to ask of those experiences that I am still here to remember them.

Deference epistemology asks us to be less than we are – and not even for our own benefit. As Nick Estes explains in the context of Indigenous politics: “The cunning of trauma politics is that it turns actual people and struggles, whether racial or Indigenous citizenship and belonging, into matters of injury. It defines an entire people mostly on their trauma and not by their aspirations or sheer humanity”. This performance is not for the benefit of Indigenous people, but “for white audiences or institutions of power”.

I also think about James Baldwin’s realization that the things that tormented him the most were “the very things that connected me with all the people who were alive, who had ever been alive”. That I have survived abuse of various kinds, have faced near-death from both accidental circumstance and violence (different as the particulars of these may be from those around me) is not a card to play in gamified social interaction or a weapon to wield in battles over prestige. It is not what gives me a special right to speak, to evaluate, or to decide for a group. It is a concrete, experiential manifestation of the vulnerability that connects me to most of the people on this Earth. It comes between me and other people not as a wall, but as a bridge.

#### Pre-scripted findings replace a close reading of the object of research.

Daniel **O’HARA** English @ Temple **‘3** *Empire Burlesque: The fate of critical culture in global America* p. 125-126

Human and All Too Human: Two Styles in Critical Ethics

The return to ethics in academic criticism, unfortunately, has resulted in the further erosion of the power to read carefully. What do I mean by such a stark assertion? For some time now, no matter what the object of analysis—a text (literary or not), a film, a cultural narrative, a historical event—critics have done less and less reading. And by reading I mean the comprehensive analysis of the complex interplay of themes and figures animating the often intricate structures of the object of analysis. That is, there are increasingly fewer attempts to treat even the usual literary objects of analysis as integral works of imagination. No one seems willing, or perhaps is still able, to follow the twists and turns of an argument, to trace the complexities of the imaginative profiles a work makes, to place statements in their full contexts, including that of an intellectual career. Too often, in recent criticism, it feels as if everything were already known in advance about the work brought forward for what turns out to be an inadequate discussion akin to shadowboxing with sound bites. Or at least this is how it usually appears. By saying this, I don’t mean to suggest we should hug close our nostalgia for either New Critical organic wholeness or deconstructive rigor mortis. Rather, I hope to point out what we are losing by doing criticism as if it were solely a cut-and-paste operation that did not derive from philology. What we lose, in short, is the contingency of reading, the sudden surprising discovery, the self-overcoming moment, when the critic has to recognize his or her education by the text, as the hole in the argument gets filled, the aporia is recognized, the structure of images does or does not subvert itself, and, yes, all those allusions the text is making do anticipate perfectly and rebound ever more sharply the reader’s— the author’s or critic’s—most precious barbs. In sum, what the initial return to ethics has fostered, ironically enough, is the erasure of the authentic ethical moment of self-judgment from recent critical practice.

1. **Ethical commitment requires relentless self-criticism and dialectics**

**Griffin, PhD Candidate, 16**

(Thabisile, <http://bostonreview.net/forum/black-study-black-struggle/thabisile-griffin-thabisile-griffin-responds-robin-kelley>, 3-7)\*A-ARP=All-African People’s Revolutionary Party

A decade on, what most resonates from my experiences in the A-APRP is the organization’s commitment to constant study and criticism. Our organizing was always fueled by our reading list and discussions, which were crucial to our understanding of systems of oppression and how we might dismantle them. Reading was central to the revolution: it was **not an extension of bourgeois university labor**, but a critical way of acquiring tools for effective action. **Collective and self-criticism were also paramount**. The members of our work-study group ranged in age from eighteen to thirty, with folk from different classes, regions, and backgrounds. Needless to say, there was conflict. Meetings would end with efforts toward constructive criticism, both of self and of the collective. In the often-complicated organizing toward freedom, the **conflict and contradictions proved to be perhaps the most generative**. It was through these **uncomfortable frictions** that we came to understand the **vital role of dialectics.** Studying and discussing led to **indispensible debates** about how to conceptualize and create freedom. I would suggest that dialectics is still how we need to seek answers, **within and beyond the university**. Although neoliberal logic would lead us to believe otherwise, there is **no fundamental divide** between scholars and “the street.” This belief is inaccurate and destructive; we both affect and are affected by each other. Many of us are from the streets and return there with each birthday and funeral, and many of us still call it home. The intellectual relationship between academics and non-academics serves as another type of integral exchange, and ushers in more of a critical dialectic. **In the academy, the access students have to particular types of resources comes with the great responsibility of building on existing discourses in new and emancipatory ways—for all of humanity.** In his essay, Kelley reminds us that students’ efforts at self-radicalization are nothing new, and such struggles are often both complicated and beautiful. He evokes the mantra of “love, study, struggle” as a fundamental guideline for our spaces. To struggle outside of institutional constraints, to study rigorously, and to practice a collective love that engulfs individualized fear and trauma. Enslaved people in the Americas did not find themselves fixed in the muddy vestiges of trauma and destruction; instead, they created explosive and beautiful means toward freedom. Kelley reminds us that it is our duty to do so as well. At UCLA—but not affiliated with the university—we founded a group called The Undercommons in January of 2016. It is a freedom school that challenges and contests not just the legitimacy of the university, but the violence of the state. The Undercommons operates horizontally, lovingly and collectively, to disrupt the professional hierarchy that is endemic to the university system, and toxic to learning spaces. Our weekly sessions strive against neoliberal competitiveness and reaffirm the capacity of anyone—community members, faculty, graduate students, undergraduates, anyone—to teach, learn, and study. However most importantly, as we respond to university and state violence, we also are creating beloved community, and eventually an international community. We seek to create the world we want to live in. The Undercommons is a celebration of insurrection, struggle, and love. We are a group of dedicated students descended from a long line of living, struggling, and laughing people. And we are living fiercely.

#### Ethical positions are insufficient – using political tools to break down monopoly through antitrust is necessary.

Vaheesan ’19 [Sandeep; Legal Director @ Open Markets Institute, JD @ Duke; “The Profound Nonsense of Consumer Welfare Antitrust,” *The Antitrust Bulletin* 1(16); AS]

III. The False Naturalization of the Market

A market economy is a state-constructed institution. Government action establishes the foundational rules of an economy—rules without which an economy cannot function. Among other things, government at different levels creates property rights, enforces contracts, charters corporations, issues money, awards copyrights and trademarks, and establishes consumer and worker rights. Antitrust rules are part of this dense layer of rules that enable and shape market activity. Despite frequent invocations of “free markets” and the “private sector” in public discourse, a market does not emerge spontaneously but depends on extensive state action.

The Supreme Court and the DOJ and the FTC, explicitly or implicitly, suppress the constitutive function of state action. Instead, in line with the paradigm of the law and economics school in general, they rely on a false conception of the market. The Court and the agencies treat existing market arrangements as somehow natural or efficient and view antitrust as exogenous government intervention that should be circumscribed. Rather than treat antitrust law as part of the stateconstructed system of market rules, judges and enforcers view antitrust as an incursion on the Edenic marketplace.

A. The State Construction of the Market

Government, at federal and state levels, establishes the conditions and rules necessary for a market to function. It creates and protects property rights, enforces contracts, charters corporations, and issues money. These are illustrative and just some examples of the state structuring and governance of the market. Without these rules and a coercive authority to enforce them, a market activity could not exist, let alone flourish. In other words, a market economy is not and cannot be “free” but is instead constructed through government action.

The state defines and enforces rules of property. The state decides what qualifies as property and offers holders of property rights, whether in land or over intangibles, the right to call on coercive state action when their interest has been infringed. And the question of what constitutes property is not stable. State action has both narrowed and broadened property. For example, the Civil War and the ratification of the 13th Amendment abolished and outlawed slavery—property rights in human beings.31 In other ways, the state has expanded the scope of property. Property over intangibles has expanded over the course of American history. For example, Congress and the courts have broadened the subject matter entitled to exclusivity rights32 and extended the length of copyright terms.33 The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970 recognized that the meaning of property is indeterminate and that common law conceptions are not preserved in an amber encasement for eternity.34

The government also facilitates the making of contracts. Courts stand ready to enforce contracts and award relief in the event one party fails to fulfill its commitments and breaches the contract. Without this coercive power, contracts would not carry the force of law. In ruling that racially restrictive covenants in housing are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court described how the purportedly private world of contract is backed by public power. The Court stated:

These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.35

Courts also withhold enforcement of other contracts. For instance, in many states, credit contracts with interest rates in excess of the state cap are unenforceable.36 Similarly, the State of California bars the judicial enforcement of noncompete clauses against workers.37

Market governance is not and cannot be neutral. In addition to being illustrative of how state action constructs a market, property and contract show how the state decides who wields power in the economy. The government through property, contract, tort, banking regulation, consumer protection, and numerous other areas of law not only sets the rules of the game but also allocates who has enforceable rights.

In expanding or narrowing legal rights, the government decides who possesses power and who does not. Workers who can organize boycotts and sympathy strikes have much greater power to unionize firms and industries and reach favorable terms with employers than workers who do not possess this right, such as American workers at present. Similarly, consider state law on noncompete clauses. A state that enforces noncompete clauses against workers tilts the balance of power in the employment relationship in favor of employers, relative to a state that does not enforce these restraints.

Against this background of market-creating state action, antitrust modifies existing legal entitlements and redistributes power within the economy. It reconfigures state construction of the economy. The late antitrust scholar John Flynn situated antitrust against this background of state action and wrote:

Antitrust policy should be viewed as it originally was in the legislative history of the antitrust laws and the Addyston Pipe & Steel case as part of the fundamental laws defining the scope of property and contract rights, rather than as a bothersome limitation upon the unfettered right to invoke the community’s law to exercise such rights.38

Consider two important ways in which antitrust reshapes common law legal entitlements. First, antitrust limits the ways in which property holders can acquire and use these legal entitlements. For example, the Clayton Act abridges the right of businesses to acquire the property rights of competing or otherwise related businesses.39 In limiting the property rights of some entities, it grants greater freedom to customers, suppliers, and others affected by the power associated with concentrated property holdings. Second, the antitrust laws limit the scope of contract law. The Sherman Act prohibits contracts that restraint trade or monopolize markets. For instance, it prohibits price-fixing contracts that raise or lower prices.40 In limiting the contractual freedom of certain parties, the Sherman Act protects, for instance, consumers from unduly high prices for essentials and workers from unfairly low wages for their labor.41

Antitrust law is analogous to nuisance law. Nuisance law restricts how property owners exercise their rights—for example, by prohibiting the operation of furnaces that produce noxious fumes that are carried downstream by the wind—to protect other property owners’ right of quiet enjoyment on their land. In a similar vein, antitrust law restricts the liberty of powerful actors to use their property rights as they wish and thereby protects the property rights and liberty of others. Like nuisance, antitrust law does not abridge rights categorically but instead reallocates them, limiting the discretionary power of corporations and enhancing the freedom of consumers, sellers, small firms, and rivals.

B. The Supreme Court and Federal Court Naturalize the Common Law Rules of the Market

In adopting and implementing consumer welfare antitrust, the Supreme Court and the antitrust agencies have naturalized the legal construction of the market. Much of this has been implicit. Their embrace of consumer welfare meant an embrace of the law and economics ideology that asserts self-regulating markets in which the state “intervenes” after the fact, for better or for worse. Against this background of a natural market and natural common law rules, antitrust is treated as a “statist” encroachment that should be treated skeptically and circumscribed. While this market naturalization is generally implicit in antitrust opinions and guidance documents, the FTC does surface it in its competition advocacy work and reveals its belief in an Edenic, prepolitical marketplace.

The law and economics ideology that has informed contemporary antitrust submerges the state action underlying a market economy. Indeed, law and economics has more deeply shaped antitrust than any other field of law. The framework of law and economics posits a market preexisting the state. The market emerges as a force of nature. The state follows and intervenes in response to discrete market failures in which existing markets do not conform to certain textbook criteria (the optimistic view of the state) or in response to political pressures from well-connected individuals and organizations (the pessimistic view of the state). In this framework, the legal construction of the existing market and economy is erased.

#### Developing a new legal imaginary that center issues of power is necessary to displace the institutional and ideological power of the law and economics synthesis. A positive program helps us link together different areas of power inequalities in the law.

Jedidiah **BRITTON-PURDY** Law @ Columbia ET AL ‘**20** (Additional Authors David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & Sabeel Rahman) “Building a Law-and-Political Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis”, 129 YALE L. J. 1784 (2020) p.1831-1835

In synthesizing these last two points, we might say that two criteria define a properly democratic political economy. First, the political community must be able to assert its collective will over the economic order, not be blocked from doing so by the antipolitics of efficiency-focused adjudication or technocracy. Second, the substance of economic life must support democratic self-rule by ensuring substantial equality, freedom from abjection and dependence, a workplace experience of dignity and self-assertion rather than vulnerability and humiliation, and the capacity to build power through institutions such as unions. A democratic political economy must be answerable to its citizens' rule, and it must produce citizens capable of ruling it.

Third, a commitment to democracy demands that we experiment with alternatives to the prevailing technologies of elite governance, particularly in the regulatory state itself. Instead of viewing state bureaucracy as a domain of apolitical expertise (or of malevolent capture and corruption), we might reconceive regulatory bodies as sites of democratic contestation.162 If purportedly neutral and technocratic visions for rationalizing governance are neither neutral nor, in practice, rationalizing, we need new conceptions of how to democratically discipline administrative decisions. What would processes of administrative accountability look like if they were wise to dynamics of power and animated by a commitment to more genuine equality? There is a dynamic scholarly agenda here, already under construction. We might explore, for example, means to bring representatives of affected communities to participate in administrative decision-making, aiming at modalities of democratic voice that could meet our needs for both (a broadened conception) of expertise and for institutionalized forms of countervailing power.163 There is a rich history of social movements engaging and seeking to remake the regulatory state in a more inclusive, but still effective, way.164 A democratic political economy compels us to revisit and build on this tradition. Like many of the cases we have advanced here, the substance of these arguments lies in political morality. A democratic political economy is a moral project, aimed at taking with full seriousness the equality of persons and our capacity to set for ourselves the terms of our collective lives, to decide how to deal out power and vulnerability, to figure out how to live together - and to defend these decisions to one another. When we follow Karl Polanyi in speaking of an economy "embedded" in society,165 we mean not just that economic ordering is always derived from legal ordering but also that an economy's ordering of power and vulnerability always bespeaks a moral vision of persons, whether egalitarian and generous or hierarchical and cramped.

Thus, scholarship should consider what moral images of social and political order are implied in a given legal patterning. What image of economic citizenship, or of a democratic economy, is embedded in a Brandeisian antitrust regime or in a labor law that assumes workers are involved in governing the workplace? In what ways is democracy or political membership hollowed out when replaced by the increasingly libertarian and wealth-maximizing premises of the Synthesis? Do "private-law" regimes here constitute citizens as market subjects who could demand a different kind of equality in these domains? What is revealed about the racialization of political membership by racial patterns of property ownership and loss, about gendered citizenship by the ways that the burdens of social reproduction interact with the wage bargain?166 Once the legal constitution of the economy is taken to be centrally about the production and enforcement of inequality, these questions present themselves naturally.

CONCLUSION

The Twentieth-Century Synthesis was a successful remaking of the legal imagination, creating a neoliberal political economy premised on concepts of efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics. But even as this was a successful intellectual shift, manifesting in a wide range of scholarly discourses, doctrinal areas, and policy changes, it has always been a fragile configuration. As the contradictions of an increasingly unequal political economy have become painfully visible and exacerbated, the veneer of consensus around this Synthesis has fallen away. Thus, we find ourselves in a moment of political crisis and accompanying intellectual upheaval: an old order of political economy and its legitimating concepts are crumbling, but a new order has yet to emerge. The outlines of the battle for a new order have come into focus. The populisms of the far right, resurgent across the globe, point to one dark path coming out of this moment: the resurgence of reactionary political economy that marries anger at economic and political corruption with exclusionary attachment to racialized and gendered hierarchy. At the same time, centrist calls for a restoration of an imagined pre-2016 consensus on norms of good governance ignore the deeper causes of neoliberalism's crisis. But in contrast to both of these visions, the account offered here points to the beginnings of a very different, more deeply democratic and progressive political economy.

To embrace the possibility of democratic renewal requires rejecting the terms of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. We believe that the legal realists-and thinkers in a much longer history of political thought-were right in believing that "the economy" is neither self-defining nor self-justifying. The emphasis in these traditions has been the right one: on power, distribution, and the need for legitimacy as the central themes in the organization of economic life. Moreover, precisely because economic ordering is a political and legal artifact, the idea of an "autonomous" economic domain has always been obscurantist and ideological, even when accepted in good faith. 167

Law does not and never could simply defer to such a realm. Rather, law is perennially involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering, most particularly through the creation and maintenance of markets. One of its most important roles, indeed, is determining who is subject to market ordering and on what terms and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or provision. 168 Thus the program of law, politics, and institution building often called "neoliberalism" is, and can only be, a specific theory of how to use state power, to what ends, and for whose benefit. 169 The ideological work of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis has been to naturalize and embed in legal institutions from the Supreme Court to the Antitrust Office and World Trade Organization a specific disposition of power**.** This power represents a deployment of market ordering that produces intense and cross-cutting forms of inequality and democratic erosion. However, Twentieth-Century Synthesis theorists tend not to see this, precisely because the Synthesis makes it so hard to see (or at least so easy to overlook).

If it is to succeed, law and political economy will also require something beyond mere critique. It will require a positive agenda. Many new and energized voices, from the legal academy to political candidates to movement activists, are already building in this direction,170 calling for and giving shape to programs for more genuine democracy that also takes seriously questions of economic power and racial subordination;1 7 1 more equal distribution of resources and life chances;172 more public and shared resources and infrastructures; 73 the displacement of concentrated corporate power and rooting of new forms of worker power;174 the end of mass incarceration and broader contestation of the long history of the criminalization and control of poor people and people of color in building capitalism; 175 the recognition of finance and money as public infrastructures; 176 the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control arising from new technologies;177 and the need for a radical new emphasis on ecology. 178 These are the materials from which a positive agenda, over time, will be built.

Political fights interact generatively with scholarly and policy debates in pointing the way toward a more democratic political economy. The emergence of new grassroots movements, campaigns, and proposals seeking to deepen our democracy is no guarantee of success. But their prevalence and influence make clear the dangers and opportunities of this moment of upheaval- and highlight the stakes of building a new legal imaginary.1 7 9 Neoliberal political economy, with its underlying commitments to efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics, helped animate, shape, and legitimate a twentieth-century consensus that erased power, encased the market, and reinscribed racialized, economic, and gendered inequities. By contrast, a legal imaginary of democratic political economy, that takes seriously underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, can inform a wave of legal thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify and accelerate these movements for structural reform- and, if we are lucky, help remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways. 175.

# 2NC

#### Surrendering to blackness essentializes and depoliticizes through deference to standpoint epistemology.

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor 16, assistant professor in Princeton University's Center for African American Studies, Ch. 7 in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, p. 211-216

Far and away, African Americans suffer most from the blunt force trauma of the American criminal justice system, but the pervasive character of law-and-order politics means that whites get caught up in its web as well. African Americans are imprisoned at an absurd rate of 2,300 for every 100,000 Black people. White people, on the other hand, are incarcerated at a rate of 450 people per 100,000. The difference speaks directly to the racial disparities that define American criminal justice, but it is worth noting that the rate at which white people in the United States are incarcerated is still higher than the incarceration rates of almost every other country in the world.33 It’s also unquestionable that Blacks and Latino/as experience death at the hands of police at much greater rates than whites, but thousands of white people have also been murdered by the police. This does not mean the experiences of whites and people of color are equal, but there is a basis for solidarity among white and nonwhite working-class people.

This more complicated picture of the material reality of white working-class life is not intended to diminish the extent to which ordinary whites buy into or accept racist ideas about Blacks. It is also true that, by every social measure, whites do better than African Americans on average, tchabut that does not say much about who benefits from the inequality of our society. For example, in a country with four hundred billionaires, what does it mean that 43 percent of white households make only between $10,000 and $49,000 a year?34 Of course, an even larger number of Black people make this pitiful amount—65 percent—but when we only compare the average incomes of working-class Blacks and whites, we miss the much more dramatic disparity between the wealthiest and everyone else.

If it isn’t in the interest of ordinary whites to be racist, why do they accept racist ideas? First, the same question could be asked of any group of workers. Why do men accept sexist ideas? Why do many Black workers accept racist anti-immigrant rhetoric? Why do many Black Caribbean and African immigrant workers think that Black Americans are lazy? Why do most American workers of all ethnicities accept racist ideas about Arabs and Muslims? In short, if most people agree that it would be in the interest of any group of workers to be more united than divided, then why do workers hold reactionary ideas that are an obstacle to unity?

There are two primary reasons: competition and the prevalence of ruling-class ideology. Capitalism creates false scarcity, the perception that need outstrips resources. When billions are spent on war, police-brutality settlements, and publicly subsidized sports stadiums, there never seems to be a shortage of money. But when it comes to schools, housing, food, and other basic necessities, politicians always complain about deficits and the need to curb spending and cut budgets. The scarcity is manufactured, but the competition over these resources is real. People who are forced to fight over basic necessities are often willing to believe the worst about other workers to justify why they should have something while others should not.

The prevailing ideology in a given society consists of the ideas that influence how we understand the world and help us make sense of our lives—through news, entertainment, education, and more. The political and economic elite shape the ideological world we all live in, to their benefit. We live in a thoroughly racist society, so it should not be surprising that people have racist ideas. The more important question is under what circumstances those ideas can change. There is a clash between the prevailing ideology in society and people’s lived experience. The media may inundate the public with constant images and news stories that describe Blacks as criminals or on welfare, but an individual’s experience with Blacks at work may completely contradict the stereotype—hence the insistence from many whites that they are not racist because they “know Black people.” It can be true in that person’s mind. People’s consciousness can change and can even contradict itself.

This is also true for African Americans, who can harbor racist ideas about other Black people while simultaneously holding antiracist ideas. After all, Black people also live in this racist society and are equally inundated with racist stereotypes. The development of consciousness is never linear—it is constantly fluctuating between adhering to ideas that fit a “common sense” conception of society and being destabilized by real-life events that upend “common sense.” The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci explains the phenomenon of mixed consciousness this way:

The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity which nonetheless involves understanding the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can . . . be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousness[es] (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. The person is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices of all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over.35

Whether or not a group of workers has reactionary, mixed, or even revolutionary consciousness does not change its objective status as exploited and oppressed labor. The achievement of consciousness is the difference between the working class being a class in itself as opposed to a class for itself. It affects whether or not workers are in a position to fundamentally alter their reality through collective action. As one writer observed, “Only a collective can develop a systematic alternative world view, can overcome to some degree the alienation of manual and mental work that imposes on everyone, on workers and intellectuals alike, a partial and fragmented view of reality.”36

Just because white workers, to take a specific example, may at times fully accept reactionary ideas about African Americans does not change the objective fact that the majority of the US poor are white, the majority of people without health insurance are white, and the majority of the homeless are white. It is true that Blacks and Latino/as are disproportionately affected by the country’s harsh economic order, but this is a reality they share with the majority of white workers. The common experience of oppression and exploitation creates the potential for a united struggle to better the conditions of all. This is obviously not an automatic process, nor is it a given that essentially economic struggles will translate to support or struggle for the political rights of Blacks to be free of discrimination and racism. Political unity, including winning white workers to the centrality of racism in shaping the lived experiences of Black and Latino/a workers, is key to their own liberation.

Tim Wise’s observations reduce these real issues to an abstract accusation of “privileging” class over race. But our movement has to have theoretical, political, and strategic clarity to confront challenges in the real world. When, in 2012, Chicago’s Black public school CEO Barbara Byrd Bennett was scheming with mayor Rahm Emanuel to close more than fifty schools located exclusively in Black and Latino/a neighborhoods, should Black teachers, students, and parents have united with Bennett, who has certainly experienced racism and sexism in her life and career, but who was also leading the charge to undo public education in Chicago? Or should they have united with the thousands of white teachers in Chicago schools and the vice president of the Chicago Teachers Union, a white, heterosexual man, to build the movement to save public education in the city?

Probably very few people in history have had as much racist invective directed at them as Barack Obama has—hating him is basically shorthand for racism now. But he has also championed policies that absolved the banks and Wall Street of any responsibility for crashing the economy; as a result, since 2007 ten million people have been displaced from more than four million homes by the foreclosure crisis.37 Should Black workers put that aside and unite with Obama out of racial solidarity and a shared “lived experience,” or should they unite with ordinary whites and Latino/as who have also lost their homes to challenge a political program that regularly defends business interests to the detriment of all working-class and poor people? In the abstract, perhaps these are complicated questions. But in the daily struggles to defend public education, fight for real healthcare reform, or stop predatory foreclosures, these are the concrete questions every movement faces.

The “blind spot” of class within the framework of people like Tim Wise not only leaves them incapable of explaining class division among the oppressed, it also underemphasizes the material foundation for solidarity and unity within the working class. Instead, the concepts of solidarity and unity are reduced to whether or not one chooses to be an “ally.” There’s nothing wrong with being an ally, but it doesn’t quite capture the degree to which Black and white workers are inextricably linked. It’s not as if white workers can simply choose not to “ally” with Black workers to no peril of their own. The scale of attack on the living standards of the working class is overwhelming. There is a systematic, bipartisan effort to dismantle the already anemic welfare state. When, in 2013, $5 billion cut was cut from food stamps, it had a direct and deleterious impact on the lives of tens of millions of white working-class people.

In this context, solidarity is not just an option; it is crucial to workers’ ability to resist the constant degradation of their living standards. Solidarity is only possible through relentless struggle to win white workers to antiracism, to expose the lie that Black workers are worse off because they somehow choose to be, and to win the white working class to the understanding that, unless they struggle, they too will continue to live lives of poverty and frustration, even if those lives are somewhat better than the lives led by Black workers. Success or failure are contingent on whether or not working people see themselves as brothers and sisters whose liberation is inextricably bound together.

Solidarity is standing in unity with people even when you have not personally experienced their particular oppression, The reality is that as long as capitalism exists, material and ideological pressures push white workers to be racist and all workers to hold each other in general suspicion. But there are moments of struggle when the mutual interests of workers are laid bare, and when the suspicion is finally turned in the other direction—at the plutocrats who live well while the rest of us suffer. The key question is whether or not in those moments of struggle a coherent political analysis of society, oppression, and exploitation can be articulated that makes sense of the world we live in, but that also champions the vision of a different kind of society—and a way to get there.

# 1NR

## K

**1NR – O/V**

**3. Market metaphors block participation and social deliberation. This turns the case impacts about increasing access and reducing power inequities.**

Angela **EIKENBERRY** D. B. and Paula Varner Professor of Public Administration @ Nebraska (Omaha) **‘9** “Refusing the Market A Democratic Discourse for Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 38 (4) p. 582-584

If one is concerned with the development and maintenance of participatory and deliberative democracy, this colonization of everyday life by the market is problematic. The ideology of the market is **essentially antisocial**, based on self-interest rather than disinterest or the public good (Saul, 1995, as cited in Zimmerman &Dart, 1998). It is impersonal and egotistic, oriented to exit rather than voice (Anderson, 1990; Smart, 2003). Market ideology also "promotes consumer identities over citizen identities" (Purcell, 2008, p. 26); consumers are self-interested individuals making choices to meet their material needs and desires in the marketplace, whereas citizens share in the authority, responsibility, and dignity of public life (King & Stivers, 1998). In a market-dominated environment, individuals are "content to become primarily consumers of goods, services, political administration, and spectacle . . dedicating themselves more to **passive consumption** and private concerns than to issues of the common good and **democratic participation**" (Kellner, n.d., para. 11-18). For this reason, market ideology and approaches allow for deep inequalities in wealth and political participation (Purcell, 2008); there is little room for the public or the public good in a marketized world. Edwards (2008) argued that too much emphasis on marketization "has the potential to endanger the most basic value of the non-profit sector-the availability of 'free space' within society for people to invent solutions to social problems and serve the public good" (p. 49).

One possible way to resist colonization by the market is to pursue a counterdiscourse to democratize everyday life. That is, following Purcell (2008), "we must imagine, foster, and publicize democratic movements" that reject the dominant market discourse "and pursue more just, more humane, and more social cooperative" futures (p. 3, emphasis in original). Participatory democrats such as Fung and Wright (2003) suggested that the way to resist marketization trends is to set up spaces for citizen participation and deliberation.

**1NR – AT: You Don’t Listen**

**3. They rely on the heroic figure of the individual self-defining entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is the metaphorical alternative to anticompetitive monopolies. The entrepreneurial strategy is trapped in cruel optimism.**

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Although much criticized (see Armstrong, 2005; Jones & Spicer, 2009; Ogbor, 2000; Tedmanson, Verduijn, Essers, & Gartner, 2012) Schumpeter's (1976) fabled and romantic notion of the **heroic entrepreneur** remains firmly embedded in entrepreneurial discourse (Anderson & Warren, 2011; Bridge, 2010; Gartner, 1988; Johnsen & Sørensen, 2017; Te Velde, 2004). Hjorth and Steyaert (2004) go so far as to contend that the literary genre that best encapsulates the entire field of entrepreneurship is that of “heroic drama”. Successful entrepreneurs, as protagonists in these dramas are invariably portrayed as hardworking, risk-taking, exceptionally talented and entirely praise- worthy. Often hailed as folk heroes who face severe adversity, it is only – as Joseph Campbell (2004, p. 54) eloquently writes in his seminal treatise on heroism – through “titanic effort” that they “succeed in building an empire of renown”. One ardent advocate of the “entrepreneur as hero” trope even asserts, with no hint of irony, that entrepreneurs “are every bit as bold and daring as the heroes who fought dragons or overcame evil” (Allen, 2009, p. 38).

Given the enshrined position of entrepreneurs in society, it is hardly surprising that to date, except for a small diffused body of work on entrepreneurial precarity that occurs on the perimeters of the field (see Heidkamp & Kergel, 2017; Monahan & Fisher, 2015), relatively little research addresses the potential downsides of following an entrepreneurial path. The paucity of research on this topic might simply be blamed on society's general propensity to value winners rather than losers (Sandage, 2005). After all, championing the metaphor of the entrepreneur as an optimistic agent of forward movement and ever- upward growth, does not naturally equate with pessimistic navel-gazing (Boutillier & Uzunidis, 2013). In any case, if captains of industry, corporate shamans, business titans, wealth creators and all the other top- flight fellows are as indomitable as the myth holds, then negativity need never be countenanced. Consequently, studies of entrepreneurship are perennially positive and overtly optimistic (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2017). Olaison and Sørensen (2014, p. 208) succinctly summarize the con- sequence of this tendency, “researchers have failed to understand entrepreneurship as a struggle with failure”.

In addressing this gap in the literature, this paper is primarily concerned with the problem of thinking beyond the exalted figure of the fully autonomous, agentic entrepreneur. To do so we break new ground by invoking a Foucauldian theoretical approach that will be fully defined and explained later in the paper. Utilizing this approach allows us to illustrate how the imperatives of the neoliberal world shape and govern how entrepreneurs think and act. This viewpoint stands in contradistinction to extant entrepreneurial theory. Among other thinkers from the critical strand of entrepreneurial studies, we believe that current theory over-emphasizes the self-determined motivations and behaviors of individuals and seriously underplays ‘the structure of feeling’ that underpins entrepreneurial activity (Down, 2010; Hjorth & Steyaert, 2004; Nodoushani & Nodoushani, 1999; Ogbor, 2000; Steyaert & Hjorth, 2006).

We also introduce the notion of ‘autopreneurs’ to describe the enterprising YouTubers who form the representative context of this study. This portmanteau of the terms ‘autobiographical’ and ‘entrepreneur’ succinctly conveys their **intensely enterprising and confessional tendencies**. Always seemingly groomed for a video-shoot or an impromptu selfie, this generation is inherently fascinated by the shifting contours of its own selfhood. Displaying filtered, airbrushed, posed and preening bodies – refracted, reflected and distorted by technology – is commonplace (Rettberg, 2014). Urged on by the neoliberal ethic, these excessively personal, intimate and confessional YouTubers, who ironically often profess to be naturally introverted, seem increasingly compelled to flaunt themselves as monetizable brands (Duffy, 2017).

The paper opens by further elaborating on the, still unfolding, technocultural context of our study and by explaining its sociohistoric importance in the contemporary moment. It continues by articulating both the Foucauldian theoretical framework that we utilize and by detailing our netnographic and ethnographic approach. In the findings proper, we demonstrate how autopreneurs internalize ‘a structure of feeling’, divined from neoliberal ideology, that shapes, directs and governs their everyday affairs. We find that three main wellsprings – the **dynamics of competition**, the **creativity dispositif**, and technologies of the self – detrimentally affect the quality of their lives and collectively institute a ‘**cruel optimism’** which promises much but delivers little (Berlant, 2011). We conclude with some thoughts on the ramifications of our work for the study of entrepreneurship.

2. Background information

There is no disputing the universality of the entrepreneurial figure as an emblem of contemporary success (Bröckling, 2016; Marttila, 2013). YouTubers are a strident group of autopreneurs, so called for the autobiographical and candid bent of their enterprise. They are parti- cularly indoctrinated in this mindset. As careful curators of the intimate happenings in their lives and recapitulation of this content for public consumption, their self-investment closely encapsulates what scholars variously designate as “an entrepreneurial DIY project” (Kelly, 2013, p. 14), “a company of one” (Lane, 2011, p. 61) and “Me Incorporated” (Bröckling, 2016, p. 20).

Certainly, their efforts to creatively grasp the ever-fleeting zeitgeist of the digital age are frequently lionized as shining examples of radical entrepreneurial endeavor (see Duffy, 2017; Weiss, 2014). According to stories in the press, many of the most successful boast six-figure in- comes. Some are signed to talent agencies and are celebrities of some renown (McAlone, 2016). Many others, though, operate much further down the popularity hierarchy. At best, they are ‘micro-celebrities’ (Marwick, 2013), small timers who scrape a living or use their still- meagre earning to supplement a day job from which they long to es- cape. Many others are still scrambling, still dreaming of acquiring a significant following, of one day having bestowed upon them the coveted title of ‘digital influencer’. Essentially though, YouTubers, of all sorts, embrace the sociotechnical capabilities of the YouTube platform to effectively sell their brand of networked individualism and as such they are – whether they know it or not – the unrivalled manifestations of living, breathing neoliberal idealists.

YouTube is the world's third most popular website. It was started in 2005 to offer a means by which people, increasingly called vloggers, could upload, view and share their user-generated video clips with like- minded followers. In the early days it was a free-for-all with no copy- right enforcement and no annoying adverts (Whu, 2016). It quickly garnered traction as the main cultural outpost of online video content, such that even Goliaths like Google could not depose it, hence why they bought it for $1.65 billion (Marwick, 2013). Videos of cute cats and dogs, domestic accidents and pranks, amateur and professional singers were common – and to an extent still are – but the site has, in recent years, been slowly transitioning into a fully-fledged network to rival the traditional providers of television entertainment (Ford, 2014). Some uploaders quickly realized that if a video clip garners attention, they could use its currency as a vehicle to promote themselves, and that is precisely what has happening in recent years. There are endless stories of how YouTube, along with other social media sites like Instagram, Snapchat and Facebook, has launched the careers of vlogging autop- reneurs. To take one example, Chiara Ferragni, from a small town outside Milan, started her blog, ‘The Blonde Salad’ in 2009. Her co- ordinated social media drive on all the major social media platforms, which essentially document little more than her looking fabulous (Cochrane, 2016), has enabled her to launch a global brand that now sells everything from suitcases to stilettos and other high-fashion items. At the same time, what is less discussed is that while some YouTubers like Ferragni have been institutionalized and professionalized, Google's commercial reorganization of the platform has, as we will later explore, marginalized and pushed others aside (Burgess, 2013).

While they might revel in, what some would dub, dispiriting con- sumerism, when they endorse a brand their followers are sure to take note (Gannon & Prothero, 2016). It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the plethora of entrepreneurial activities that occur on You- Tube, but it is perhaps worth expanding on the business model that sustains a section of the most prominent autopreneurs. Beauty and fashion vloggers like the quintessential Zoella – who is so famous that she has an officially-sanctioned emoticon by Twitter, not to mention a waxwork effigy in Madame Tussauds – are signed-up to international multi-channel network Style Haul and are managed by the talent agency, Gleam Futures (Woods, 2016). Together they contrive style tutorials and direct-to-camera monologues, all the while variously chatting about their lives, casually introducing products, doing fun collaborations with other YouTubers, and hosting Q&A sessions. Burgess and Green's (2009) excellent study of YouTube, for instance, contends that its ‘affective economy’ is built on participation, ‘para- social’ interaction, and ‘authentic’ emotion. Certainly, since much of this activity is located in bedrooms, the whole enterprise is lent a cer- tain aura of authenticity and intimacy that appeals to youthful audi- ences. These successful autopreneurs glean money from YouTube's AdSense campaign which pays $2 per thousand views. In addition, big bucks are garnered by transferring their talent to television (Dredge, 2016), and by developing direct relationships with brands. This natu- rally suggests less independence-of-direction than the fans and fol- lowers of these channels would expect. To tackle this ambiguity, in 2014, the Advertising Standards Authority ruled that sponsored content in YouTube videos must be clearly marked as such in a video's title or description box. Naturally, most vloggers choose the less obtrusive description box.

3. Foucauldian neoliberal theory

3.1. Background

As we have seen, the entrepreneurial vein, that carries the econo- my's lifeblood, runs deep. It is underpinned by the ideology of neoli- beralism, which has precipitated unprecedented cultural change by appealing to the values of “...individual freedom, creativity and he- donism” (Hewison, 2014, p. 21). The brilliance of capitalism, as Harvey (2010, p.160) notes, “...relies upon the instincts, enterprise and sometimes crazy ideas...of individual entrepreneurs operating in par- ticular places and times.” This spirit of what is called ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’ has come to constitute the reality of our individual onto- logical conditions (Peters, 2016; Scharff, 2016). Subjectivity refers to the way in which subjects or people, despite frequent assertions to the contrary, are not entirely free to create and re-create themselves at will (Hall, 2004); they are always linked to externalities. The self is not, as Mansfield (2000, p. 3) asserts, “a separate and isolated entity, but one that operates at the intersection of general truths and shared princi- ples,” and, we would add, ideologies. The notion of ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’ derived from Foucault's (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics [...], refers to how the self is subject to neoliberal ideals such as: “self-re- liance, personal responsibility, boldness and a willingness to take risks in the pursuit of goals” (du Gay, 1996, p. 56). As Foucault famously elaborates, the neoliberal subject is “an entrepreneur of himself...being for himself his producer, being for himself his own capital, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.” (Smith, 2015, p. 52).

The term ‘neoliberalism’ was once deemed entirely positive, though its usage today has taken on a rather negative slant such that “virtually no one self-identifies as a neoliberal” (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 140). In the period betwixt the first and second world wars the Freiberg School of German economists cast neoliberalism as a “moderate” hu- manistic alternative to the market-orientated philosophy of governance known as “classical [laissez-faire] liberalism” which had preceded it (pp. 139, 145). Currently there is no universally accepted definition of the term. Across the arts and humanities, numerous iterations of neo- liberal theory can be discerned. Flew's (2014) comprehensive audit of the literature suggests several alternative renderings. While warning against adopting the term as simply “an all-purpose denunciatory ca- tegory”, or as a catchphrase that merely elucidates “the way things are”, he argues that perhaps the most theoretical value can be found in ap- proaches that construe the term as “a dominant ideology of global ca- pitalism” and as “a form of governmentality and hegemony” (p. 49). It is in respect of these latter iterations that we draw sustenance for this project.

3.2. Dynamic of competition

Turning specifically to Foucault (2008) while his work can be intellectually challenging, it does provide relatively perspicuous theoretical takeaways which when read closely, in conjunction with sub- sequent elaborations by other authors, key principles can be discerned that have relevance to our study. His work has also previously been used to study entrepreneurship, though in a quite different fashion to the one we follow here (see Jones & Spicer, 2005; Ogbor, 2000). The first abiding principle we find useful is the ever-present dynamic of competition. Foucault (2008, p. 147) states that we live in “a society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket society, but an enterprise society. The homo economicus sought after is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production.” This idea, of course, is fairly ubiquitous. For centuries, ongoing popular rhetoric on the rise of individualism (Perelman, 2005) and the march of meritocracy (Frank, 2016), myths though they un- doubtedly are, have collectively espoused “the entrepreneurial ideal” which holds that through hard work and talent any individual can reap enormous rewards (Loeb, 1994, p. 162). Individualism is said to be “an **ideology based on self-determination**, where free actors are assumed to make choices that have direct consequences for their own unique des- tiny” (Callero, 2013, p. 15). In the absence of fixed and traditional norms, abiding by its logic puts individuals firmly in charge of **producing their own biographies**. Similarly, ‘meritocracy’, as McNamee and Miller, 2009, p. 1) state, is the firm belief that, “if you work hard enough and are talented enough, you can overcome any obstacle and achieve success”. Widespread belief in these neoliberal sentiments are said to be what sustains the success of television talent shows such as the X Factor, where participants can become the central protagonists of a romantic ‘rags-to-riches’ success story (Hackley, Brown, & Rungpaka- Hackley, 2013; Stahl, 2004). Then, of course, there is The Apprentice, the vehicle which is at least partly responsible for installing Donald Trump in the White House, which “gives the lie that each of us can make it big with the right amount of pluck and entrepreneurial de- termination” (Taylor, 2013, p. 62).

3.3. Creativity dispositif

Another commonly utilized Foucauldian principle is that of governmentality. It portrays neoliberalism as a form of power that disseminates market values to all spheres of life, to facilitate “the governing of individuals from a distance’ (Larner, 2000, p. 6), by shaping their subjectivities. Its genius, of course, is that it **makes** **people think they are entirely autonomous** and **self-directing** when, in reality, their agentic personalities are subject to neoliberal logic. Neoliberalism thus creates people who feel entirely responsible for the conditions in which they live. Specifically, the kind of governmentality that most affects young people trying to build careers for themselves on YouTube or in other spheres of creativity has been identified by McRobbie (2016) as the ‘creativity dispositif’. It is comprised of anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, position, control or protect the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of individuals, and can, itself, derive from other discourses, practices, propositions and institutions. The dispositif itself is the system of relations established between these diffuse elements. Collectively they have the ideological effect of en- couraging young people to “bypasses mainstream employment with its trade unions and its tranches of welfare and protection in favour of the challenge and excitement of being a creative entrepreneur” (McRobbie, 2016, p. 11). Thus, all the tales told of teenagers in their bedrooms, “striking it rich with a video camera, youth media created seemingly without industrial intervention, content created by youth for youth” (Woods, 2016, p. 237), become part of the creativity dispotif, which young people subsequently seek to emulate.

**4. Individualizing entrepreneurial discourse relies on the transgression of authority. Recognizing demands for social worth ties us more deeply to cruel market competition.**

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The internalisation of enterprise culture

In the enterprise culture, as Marquand (1992) argues, economic expectations (what benefits the market) become normative expectations and get transformed into ‘righteously’ presented demands**.** In short, society rewards economic agents who live up to these expectations and punishes those who fail to fulfil their demands. What we get attached to closely connected to notions of value and worth (Taylor, 1985) – the latter shaped by economic, cultural and historical classificatory sets of values (Skeggs, 2004). These economic tenets open up space for a new form of political ideology grounded in the notion of the 'enterprising self' (Rose, 1989) i.e. the self which is expected to be capable of both re-evaluating and changing its social, economic and moral positions according to market (Heelas and Morris, 1992). Here, the process of internalization of enterprise discourse is seen to contribute to the creation of entrepreneurial identities in different spheres of contemporary life (Du Gay, 1996, 2003; Fournier, 1998; Nicholson and Anderson, 2005; Ogbor, 2000) – based on the ‘liberating’ capacities to surmount obstacles, be innovative and take risks (Skillen, 1992). In recent years, this ‘innovative self’ (Betta et al., 2010) has come to represent a new emancipatory force (Rindova et al., 2009) with diverse social change activities and practices (Calas et al., 2009; Fournier and Grey, 2000; Hjorth, 2007; Steyaert, 2007; Steyaert and Katz, 2004). Hence, the notion of entrepreneurship has been re-framed as a process of ‘entrepreneuring’ in order to emphasize the role of actions, entrepreneurial agency and choice in the entrepreneurial ‘drive for autonomy, expression of personal values and making a difference in the world’ (Goss et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2009, p. 478). Here, new innovative subjects (Betta et al., 2010) are expected to break free from authorityand author their environments through declarations regarding their economic and social worth (Rindova et al., 2009).

this context, for the entrepreneurial drive to be sustainable, entrepreneurs' powers to succeed need to be emphasized (Goss, 2005) and supported by individual stories of success. Failure, if temporary, can be an important backdrop to the success story through accounts of challenge and of ‘fighting back’. As Bouchikhi (1993) argues, enormous energy is expended in resisting failure. Therefore, 'success ethics' and the 'achievement principle' function as a set of instructions for what entrepreneurs must do to be worthy of their title where success may be rendered a ‘compulsory condition’ of establishing self-worth. In contemporary society a 'successful' or 'achieved' self is granted a special status and rewarded with privileges and power. Therefore, success is desirable both for the status that one gains and for the sense of self worth that accompanies it (Elkins, 1985). 'Success ethics' reinforce the significance of such traits and drives as asset accruing, work competition, risk taking as a potential source of valued social identity (Goffman, 1990).

If respect and recognition are to be conferred only on those who classify as achievers (Skeggs, 2004), insecurities about self can become a permanent feature of everyday experience (Collinson, 2003) especially as entrepreneurial aspiration is unlikely to be achieved in full. Further, a society where self worth is conditional upon limiting, fleeing and mostly unattainable notions of 'success' sets off recurrent insecurities and anxieties about self and status (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Bankruptcy is a particularly interesting case where the position of the failed subjects often cannot be redeemed because of the specific type of social stigma attached (Efrat,2005). Historically, various shaming and demeaning practices, including publicly cutting the bankrupt's hair, branding the person's palm with the letter 'T' for 'thief', and publicly piercing the debtor's ear with a nail, were used in order to direct attention at social deviants (Mann, 2002). As Goffman (1990) argues, deviancy that emanates from characteristics understood as the individual's own fault attracts more reprobation. This is supported by Efrat (2005) who suggests that historically, harsher treatment was meted out to those who were considered blameworthy and responsible for their deviant behaviour. This resonates with meanings attached to and manifestations of bankruptcy where stigma persists precisely because bankruptcy is still deemed the individual's fault – even though, as Austin et al.(2006) claim, individuals possess very limited control over contextual factors such as the macro-economy, tax and regulatory structures and the sociopolitical environment. The taxonomies of difference between an 'achieved self' and a failed subject can become increasingly problematized by individuals' attachment to the notion of success, achievement and the concept of a worthy self. These normative demands and the ensuing struggles for recognition are likely to be condensed within the bankruptcy experience, the focus of this study, as individuals encounter the often profound effects of business failure. Following the above, this chapter draws on Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism and her notion of optimistic attachment to explores managing simultaneously incoherent narratives of in the context of bankruptcy failure and how success ethics and the achievement principle are implicated in this process. . This has implications for the pursuit of symbolic security .

Berlant’s cruel optimism

For Berlant (2011), optimism is a force ‘that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring you closer to the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of ... a way of life, a project, a concept, or scene’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 1). Optimism is rendered cruel when something one strives and longs for becomes ‘an obstacle to his/her flourishing’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 1). Berlant highlights that not every instance of optimism is cruel; however, optimism grows cruel when the project that entices one’s attachment becomes an impediment to the accomplishment of one’s original goal. In her discussion of the affective structure of an attachment she draws attention to the sustaining need to return to the desirable – to the scene of fantasy. This return ignites a repeated sense of possibility even if the possibility is not absent. Thus, cruel optimism, for Berlant, designates a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of the possible whose realisation is discovered... to be impossible’ (Berlant, 2007, p. 33), it also implies that the affective attachment to the ‘right’ project - where right stands for normatively defined ‘right’ – can potentially turn out for many to be a harmful life. As Berlant puts it, sustaining optimistic attachment ‘wears out the subjects who nonetheless and at the same time, find the conditions of possibility within it (Berlant, 2007, p.35). Using Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism we would like to think about why entrepreneurs ‘choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to’, to unceasingly adhere to the same hopes, visions, aspirations, and confidences that have been repeatedly failing them.

**1NR – AT: Alt Can’t Solve**

**2. Refusing market metaphors stops the expansion of instrumentality. Relational ethics prioritize connection over zero-sum competition as the basis for understanding social relationships.**

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In the next section of this essay we invite consideration of our call to transform the predominant instrumental ethic that drives much human engagement. We are particularly interested not only in the concern with the instrumentalization of people and the earth but in the transformation of this predominant ethic to one of relationality. We propose the amplification of a relational ethic that may bring the spirit of humanity implied in Dees's definition of social entrepreneurs, not only to understand his segregation of social enterprise from the market "proper" but to encourage a critical transformation of that very market in ways that amplify the values articulated by Dees (2001, p. 1) across all the sectors, whose boundaries are indeed blurring.

We do this by drawing more fully on the characteristics of a social entrepreneur provided by Dees (2001, p.4), and on the organizational critique and the transformational aspirations of critical theorists, particularly through our interest in the work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas is concerned about the increasing **colonization of "the lifeworld**" by the encroaching **instrumental logic of markets in all spheres** of human endeavors and so are we. He suggests that new social movements such as **environmentalism**, **feminism**, and **post-colonialism**, provide avenues for the development of new values and identities. He argues that these movements represent transition from **old politics based on economic and military security to new politics involving the enhancement of quality of life**, **equality**, and **enhanced political and social participation**.

We concur with Habermas. There are many voices challenging liberal capitalism. We believe that the changes they call for may bring us a more human and environmentally sound future if the concerns expressed by these voices are not merely assimilated into, but leaving largely unchanged, the predominating market modality of instrumentalism (Grice and Humphries, 1997). This instrumentality, garbed in the cloak of functionality, is expressed as a commitment to efficiency, productivity and growth. However, it largely serves a limited assumption for the right (and espoused duty) of capital to seek places and processes through which to maximize return on investment, and the necessity for all to be in its service. We refer readers to the integration of the concept of "flourishing," a concept that entails wellbeing, dignity and the achievement of one's creative potential and we draw towards an appreciation of a relational ethic.

By a relational ethic, we mean a prioritization of concern about who we are to each other, what we might legitimately expect from each other as human beings—always in relation one to another and to the earth. This way of being invites a subtle shift from an instrumental ethic that assesses how we might harness the energies of others to extract the maximum value of the relationship for our own benefit. It means treating each human being as fully human—as purposeful and free—not as a means to our own ends. This shifting of focus could only be achieved, in our view, by paying overt attention to and transforming the instrumental ethic dominating the contemporary organizational modalities now reaching into all aspects of human endeavor and by collaboration with human communities whose interests and needs are proposed to be channeled through a Social Enterprise paradigm. If this is not to be done through a functionalist discourse, or with a presumption that "free markets know best" then the relationships between Social Entrepreneurs and their communities must be complex and must have emancipatory intent. This context requires the dialogue that Habermas advocates.

**1NR – AT: Perm**

**Market discourse must be explicitly rejected – there is no chance to re-appropriate the metaphor.**

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The market discourse

While a definition of markets is possible, the result of using such a definition is a more circumscribed use of the term. However, the narrower use of the term does little to stop, and may encourage, the continued dominance of the market-as-exchange definition by trying to use the same language but meaning something different. What is needed, then, is ground clearance through an explicit 5 rejection of the language of “the market”. Without such an explicit rejection the market discourse - the societal language and ideas about the economy built upon the market-as-exchange definition - will continue to infect and corrupt society’s understanding of political economy.

Put briefly, the market discourse holds that the market is natural (which is based on a fundamental division between economics and politics), supply and demand (solely) determine market outcomes (particularly price), competition and price dynamics result in an equilibrium absent government interference, market activity is the only productive element within the economy, the market is demand driven (consumers have significant power to alter economic outcomes), the market allows decentralised decision-making, the market is the most capable institution of information processing (making market outcomes inherently efficient), competitive outcomes are fair (victory is to the strong, which allows competitive hierarchy), and that all exchange is voluntary and all participants are equal.6

Some of these ideas are often directly referenced in social discourse (supply and demand, for example), others are only indirectly grasped (competitive hierarchy, as a consequence of beliefs about the competitive process, is rarely directly expressed). Nor are all of these ideas always present - the Hayekian points about decentralised decision-making and information processing are less present in lay understandings of the market, but more present in elite political discourse. However, the ideas above broadly represent the connotations of using the market term and constitute the prism with which any academic definition must contend; even the most careful take on the market has to first explicitly disentangle itself from the baggage of the market discourse and colloquial usage of the term.

On top of the general market discourse there are two further augmentations of how the market is discussed. First, the market becomes reified and anthropomorphised. This take on the market can often be seen in financial reporting, where the market reacts to events, judges government policies, can be uncertain, and expresses a whole range of different emotions. The change is essentially from, for example, panic in the market (i.e. the market as a place with participants) to the market panicking. The change is small but plasters over the disunity of purpose and action that comes from competing interests, differential levels of information, and Keynes’ animal spirits with a vision of a unified and rationally-processing organism.

Second, building on the first point, the anthropomorphised market becomes deified. The judgements of the market are assumed to reflect a fundamental grasp on the nature of reality above and beyond the judgements of individuals. A consequence of this is that market judgements are elevated above any other mechanism for deciding social questions. As Cox (2016: 11) writes “current thinking already assigns to The Market a comprehensive wisdom that in the past only the gods have known.” A common manifestation of this idea in the political arena is the refrain “government shouldn’t pick winners and losers, that should be left to the market” for it is the market that will make the best choice. There is a further level to deified market, and that is its role as a political panacea - any issue can be turned over to the market, which with its natural mechanistic drive to equilibrium will solve any problem put before it.

**Marketplace of ideas rhetoric cannot be re-purposed – it naturalizes and universalizes neoclassical economics.**

Terry **HATHAWAY** Prf. @ University of York **’21** “Fuck the Market” *Real-world Economics Review* 97 p. 62-63

Contemporary political and economic discourse sees capitalist systems characterised as market economies, and references to both The Market and markets are ubiquitous; markets are seemingly everywhere. This situation is distinctly odd, as while economic relations have been more and more characterised as “markets”, many economies have seen both the withering away of traditional marketplaces and the concurrent growth of hierarchically ordered non-market economic organisations (i.e. corporations).

The reason that markets can be both seen everywhere and exist practically nowhere is due to two points. First, “markets” have been defined according to abstract principles - often product similarity or price uniformity - that do not include place. While abstraction is not an issue per se, abstraction that cuts away from a central defining feature - in this case, the place of marketplace - is unhelpful. Second, the dominant definition of the market, stemming from neoclassical economics, has chosen exchange as the principle by which a market is defined; whenever there is exchange there is a market. Rendering “the market” as a synonym for “exchange” means that “the market” can be seen in all economic systems throughout the entirety of human existence and paints capitalist relations of transactionary exchange as universal, natural and inevitable; “in the beginning there were markets” as Williamson (1975: 21) writes.

The consequence of these two points is that we are left with an idea of the market that is non-instituted and non-socialised. Moreover, the latter definition of “the market” captures everything and so defines nothing. It is, however, possible to rescue a definition of “the market” by including a requirement of place alongside exchange, multiple sellers, and similar goods. Applying such a definition, however, renders markets a relatively marginal part of contemporary capitalism.

While this argument may appear to rest on pedantry, the consequences of labelling economic exchange as a market are huge due to the centrality of the market to economic discourse and imagination. Using the term “market” brings up the image of the bustling marketplace, bazaar, or souk where prices are subject to bargaining between buyer and seller, and sharp competition occurs between the many stall­ holders. Calling exchange “the market” thus implicitly characterises the exchange as taking place in a competitive environment, with broad equality of bargaining power, and with prices dynamically responding to the laws of supply and demand. In this manner, the market-as-exchange definition smuggles in a whole range of other ideas; the definition is central to a wider, and politically hegemonic, market discourse.

The hegemonic nature of the discourse can be seen in the conceptual imperialism of the market,

with the economic language of the market being applied to non-economic matters, which is only really possible due to the thinness of the market-as-exchange definition. Prominent examples of this imperialism are the “marketplace of ideas**”,** the “sexual marketplace”, and the “political marketplace” (Hodgson, 2019). In each situation, the point of adopting the market discourse is to stress the fairness and openness of the situation, a competitive element to the situation, and that outcomes of this situation are properly and unbiasedly arrived at. In the marketplace of ideas, for the most popular (and legally important) instance, the central thrust is that if ideas are allowed to compete, the best/most truthful ideas will win out (Blocher, 2007).

#### The perm supports the master discourse of economism.

Rhodes & Garrick ‘2 [Dr Carl; and Dr John; Rhodes is Professor of Organization Studies and Deputy Dean at UTS Business School, University Fellow in Law at Charles Darwin University, “Economic metaphors and working knowledge: enter the ‘cogito-economic’ subject,” Human Resources Development International, 5(1), 87-97, 2002.

Introduction

In this paper we ask the question: what are the effects of defining knowledge in economic terms? In addressing this question, we particularly look at how the language of commerce has appropriated knowledge by defining it in its own terms. We then examine the effects of the metaphorical language that has emerged out of recent theorizations of knowledge, arguing that this has generated a powerful discourse that defines people as ‘cogito-economic subjects’. By defining people in this way, we suggest, there are potential dangers of metaphors becoming reified, such that knowledge becomes describable only in economic terms and people become describable only in cogito-economic terms. This implies that subjects are both ‘knowledge workers’ (cogito) and ‘human resources’ (economic). We propose that this represents a conflation of knowledge and commercial interests. We further argue that this can be problematic in so far as the conflation attempts to bring knowledge ‘under control’. In this way the people through whom such ‘working knowledge’ is mediated are meant to become more manageable. Indeed, the knowledge management systems of postindustrial organizations are, in part, both products and producers of this discourse.

With the advent of the post-industrial economy, knowledge has entered the workplace in ways that it never had before. The use of the term ‘post-industrialism’ itself is suggestive of ‘a shift in the structure of industrial capitalism away from mass production and bureaucracy and indicating changing technologies of production, a growth in the service sector and changes in the knowledge requirements of work’ (White and Jacques 1995: 48). Further, in post-industrial economies the management of work has also changed through the impact of information technology and the development of alternative organizational forms (Alvesson and Berg 1992). These new organizations in turn need people who do work in correspondingly new and different ways as, in the ‘knowledge economy’, work has become less physical and more discursive. Gee et al. aptly put it this way:

Contemporary, globally competitive businesses don’t any longer compete on the basis of their products or services per se. They compete, rather, on the basis of how much learning and knowledge they can use as leverage in order to expeditiously invent, produce, distribute and market their goods and services, as well as to innovatively vary and customize them. (Gee et al. 1996: 5)

Against this complex backdrop of such post-industrial work conditions, where might we epistemologically locate the ‘working knowledge’ that is now thought to be even more important than it was in the past? Further, how might we evaluate the effects of this form of knowledge? The emerging discourse of ‘working knowledge’ is indicative of a pragmatic turn in our orientation towards what counts as knowledge. Epistemologically, working knowledge is not only in work; it is what works. The question of what works is invariably a matter of judgement of the effect of knowledge on economic imperatives, with outcomes shaped by criteria such as economic growth, commercial projections and company research into areas such as consumer satisfaction. Working knowledge can, as a consequence, easily become a vehicle for forging particular policies or projects that represent dominant perspectives that are legitimated by commercial considerations. An important part of this legitimization is the employ- ment of a new language through which the knowledge requirements of the new economy are both articulated and created. This language employs terms such as ‘human capital’, ‘knowledge assets’, ‘the knowledge economy’, ‘the information economy’ and ‘knowledge workers’ to explore, define and create new ways of looking at knowledge. The way that knowledge is theorized has become increasingly mediated through economic, commercial and accounting metaphors such as ‘the balanced scorecard’ and ‘intangible assets’. In turn, these metaphors construct social understandings of working knowledge and professional practices.

The advent of knowledge work

Corporate managers and many academics have increasingly recognized professional knowledge as being ‘valid’ in its own right. It is knowledge that does not rely on validation established by scientific research, nor is it beholden to the legitimizing practices of the academy or the ‘research centre’. Working knowledge emanates from actually doing the work. In The Reective Practitioner, Schön (1983) convincingly argued that knowledge, of an action-oriented character, is embedded in professional activity and can be subject to real-time critical reection by professional practitioners. In Schön’s sense of practice, professional knowledge is potentially open-ended – even in its action elements – with reective abilities being pivotal. In this knowledge, good professional practice involves making and reecting on the best judgements in specic contexts, for ethical as well as commercial considerations. Work is both site and instrument of evaluating such working knowledge. The business world and the corporate sector in particular now encourage new, even critical, ideas (Drucker 1995) (although thoroughgoing critique, we would argue, continues to be largely discouraged). If ‘working knowledge’ is to be a coherent construction and not just a fashionable description of particular elements of technological-age work, or a disguise for purely technical and financial interests, it should follow that adequate avenues for reexivity need to be built into its production. This is a key challenge for the action-oriented research approaches now favoured by many organizations. Transparency, openness, critical self-reection, highly developed systems that promote peer assessment and review, and the development of professional associations that have contact with the academic world would be among possible components of a new epistemological ‘infrastructure’ for working knowledge. And there are signs that such components are beginning to take shape. Government higher education policies across European Union member nations, the US, Canada and Australia are actively encouraging new university–industry partnering arrangements emphasizing collaborative research between faculties and particular companies and flexible and work-based (as distinct from classroom-based) approaches to learning. What is at stake is both the character of what we take knowledge to be and, even more seriously, the extent to which we are moving towards – or away from – a more open society. In a global world saturated by information available through the Internet, openness may turn out to be one pragmatic option. In the ‘knowledge society’, the issue arises as to where an organization is positioned in terms of knowledge – with which knowledge networks is it connected (Castells 1997)? Barnett expands on this ‘positioning’, pointing out that: We are seeing the rise of corporate universities – such as that in the UK spawned by British Aerospace – but they are not noted for their sponsorship among their employees of receptivity to Greek philosophy or the nineteenth century novel. A knowledge audit would reveal that they focus on technical and managerial knowledge; and, even there, will want to develop among their employees certain usable knowledges – and their associated skills – with likely productive value for the organization. (Barnett 2000: 20) Such developments are indicative of changes in knowledge that are brought about by the new role that corporations play in knowledge production. This new role, in turn, shapes the relationships that people can have with the corporations where they are employed and works to impose limits on the subjectivities available to them. Edwards and Tait (2000) argue that this ‘willing’ employee entails ‘an active subjectivity’ – aligned to organizational goals – producing what Casey (1995) terms ‘designer employees’. As we pointed out in our introduction, in the context of post-industrial work conditions, the epistemological location of ‘working knowledge’ is indeed problematic. The advent of ‘working knowledge’ demonstrates a pragmatic orientation to knowl- edge, where knowledge is not only in work; it is what works(Garrick and Rhodes 2000: 8). Based on such pragmatism, the ‘working’ in knowledge can become a way to dene workplace practices that seek to reinforce and privilege ways of being and knowing that are judged illegitimate if they do not reect commercial interests. The danger here is not that knowledge can be of value to commercial interests in itself, but rather that commerce becomes the sole criterion for judging knowledge. For instance, with modern information and communications technologies (and the call from shareholders for greater accountability), new possibilities for openness and mutual evaluation are being generated, but nonetheless commercial discourses certainly remain dominant. As such, Lyotard’s question: ‘who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?’ (1984: 9) remains very pertinent to developing reexive approaches to knowledge work. Metaphors: signifying knowledge at work The very notion of ‘working knowledge’ is suggestive of a historicization that claims we have moved from an agrarian to an industrial and then, in the post-World War Two era, to a knowledge and information society. Hand in hand with the notion of the ‘knowledge society’ has come a new range of signiers used to dene people. Moving away from just referring to people as ‘workers’, ‘employees’ or ‘staff’, these new signiers rely heavily on terminology related to both economics and knowledge. One of the earliest examples of this was the idea of ‘human capital’ (Schultz 1961). Schultz’s argument was that much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital – the productive capabilities of human beings. These capabilities, in Schultz’s human capital perspective, are acquired at a cost and, in turn, command a price in the labour market – the level of which depends on how useful they are in producing goods and services. Since then, there has been a proliferation of terms expanding on this basic premise to describe people in economic and/or knowledge terms. Such terms include ‘human resource development’ (HRD) and the related practices of ‘human resource management’ (HRM), ‘knowledge workers’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge capital’ and, more recently, the managerial jargon of ‘employees are our greatest asset’. One common characteristic of this terminology is the use of economic metaphors such as capital, resources and assets to describe people at work. We believe that attention to the development of such metaphors is important as they provide valuable insights into life in commercial organizations. Palmer and Dunford (1996) also point out that some metaphors may be so embedded in particular contexts that they come to constitute an ‘authentic’ discourse that permits no flexibility or change in ways of looking at organizations and the people in them. Here attempts at introducing new ideas or metaphors might nd it hard not to be ‘colonized’ by existing dominant organizational metaphors. The notion of ‘human resources’ serves as a good example of part of such an ‘authentic discourse’ – one that has ‘graduated’ to now being a dead metaphor, that is, a metaphor whose metaphoricity is forgotten. The growth of the use of the term ‘human resources’ in popular management books, academic texts, management education subjects and the naming of functional departments in organizations has come to see the ‘human resource’ as being a dominant term used to refer to people in work organizations. The use of the term ‘resource’ to describe people here loses its metaphoric character and is readily seen as a literal term to describe people. The word ‘resource’, however, has a genealogy that relates back to the description of economic and nancial phenomena – where a resource refers to a means of producing wealth or property that can be converted into money. Here the use of the word ‘resource’ becomes a metaphor to describe people, but it is a metaphor borrowed from the corporate domain in which people are dened in terms of managerial prerogatives. Much of the terminology that has emerged to dene people in the postindustrial context uses this textual practice. Intellectual capital, knowledge capital and human capital are other prime illustrations, each working to dene people in terms of their central concept: capital itself. Capital is the wealth that is employed in order to produce goods and services, and people become linguistically subsumed as just another form of capital. The metaphor translates ‘being’ through the terminology of commerce – thus the cogito-economic subject.

The use of such metaphors to drive representations of people at work is a way of exerting control over the identities of those people. Defining people in particular terms and using particular metaphors foregrounds certain ways of understanding people and backgrounds others (Rhodes 2000) – in the case described here, the economic metaphors do this too, they draw attention to people as economic subjects (capital, assets, resources) that are inputs into an organizational system. This is a profound example of the politics of representation at work where overtly benign descriptions enact powerful controls over the subject positions open to people in particular social contexts. As Cooper puts it:

Technologies of representation convert the inaccessible, unknown and private into the accessible, known and public; they convert the deferred and faraway into the instantaneous and immediate; and their portability and mobility makes them easy to manipulate and control. (Cooper 1992: 267)

In terms of commercial organizations, Deetz has suggested that the development of industrialization replaced a set of representations based on ‘intrinsic’ values with one based on a system of exchange values represented by money. It is here that ‘labour became articulated as a “cost” to the organization’ (1995: 228). Deetz goes on to argue that, for the modern corporation, the reason for working is to make money and any alternative motives are considered only in terms of their effect on commitment, productivity and sales as translated in monetary terms. This is a privileging of a monetary code as a representation practice in which everything is economic: everything including people. Such privileging serves to enact a form of control through which economic subjects emerge out of the very interests that seek to define people in those (economic) terms.

In contemporary organization and management studies literature, definitions of people in economic terms have taken a further turn from that described by Deetz. The use of language such as ‘working knowledge’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge assets’ and so forth takes the use of economic metaphor and adds to it another powerful linguistic substitution. The first turn is to use economic metaphor to describe people; the second turn is to introduce the synecdoche of knowledge and intellect. Synecdoche works in this way to use a part of something to describe the whole – it is people’s intellectual capacity and their knowledge that is used to describe their ‘whole’. The result is the creation of a disembodied subjectivity that defines people economically and focuses their ‘value’ in terms of their intellectual capacity – again as cogito-economic subjects. For instance, an economic person might be one whose person is knowledge. Deetz argues that such practices create a ‘closed politics . . . owing to a variety of practices which produce and privilege certain interests – principally managerial – in both public decision making and in the production of the type of person that exists in modern organizations and society’ (1995: 215). Our concern is that an arena is constructed where the only legitimate knowledge might be that which is deemed economically viable and the only legitimate subjectivity is one where people are defined in these terms.

Enter Jacques

Usure

In order to explore further how this play of metaphor works, this section of the paper will use Derrida’s (1982) discussion of the use of metaphor in philosophy to review analogously the use of cogito-economic metaphors to define selves. Derrida (1982) uses the term ‘usure’ to examine the use of metaphor in philosophy. He uses this term in relation to its double meaning in the French language – usure as usury (i.e. the acquisition of too much interest) and usure as using up or the deterioration through usage. The usure of metaphor, therefore, is simultaneously the rubbing away of the original and the creation of ‘linguistic surplus value’. A metaphor such as the ‘human resource’ can be used to illustrate this. In the metaphorical term ‘resource’ there is a suggestion that human resources were something else prior to the ‘resource’ metaphor being applied and becoming commonplace. It implies an original, concrete figure of a pre-economic subject, equivalent to what might have been considered the literal meaning of ‘being human’. The first move of the usure of metaphor, then, is to wear out an ‘original meaning’; for the metaphor to no longer be noticed and to be taken for the ‘proper’ meaning.1 The metaphor is used, ‘human resources’ is worn out as its apparent metaphoricity is suspended. People are no longer seen as resources but are resources.

At the same time as the wearing out occurs, the metaphor is also producing a surplus value – a ‘tropic supplementarity’ (Derrida 1982: 210): ‘The supplementary product of a capital, the exchange which far from losing the original investment would fructify its initial wealth, would increase its return in the form of revenue, additional interest, linguistic surplus value’ (1982: 210).

Here the distinction between the two parts of the word ‘usure’ is indistinguishable. There is a proliferation of the signifier that is created, as meaning is displaced from one term to another – for example from worker to resource. Describing people as workers focuses on their activity; as resource it focuses on their value to the enterprise. The usure of the metaphor thus creates a surplus of meaning. This is a supplement – a substitutive signification – ‘which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the “real” supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement’ (Derrida 1976: 7). Metaphor then creates surplus as one signier is replaced by another – in this case through the metaphor of person as signied as a ‘resource’: as well as what a person might have been before, now there is more; now a person is also a resource. The adoption of a new use of language to describe people is therefore not innocent. It is not just about using different words to signify the same thing. Rather, translating concepts from one signier to another (in our illustration from ‘person’ to ‘resource’) cannot be pure, transparent or unequivocal. Paraphrasing Derrida (1996), the meaning of a concept is not separable from the process of passage or from the signifying operation. The translation to the new signifier is generative – it is a supplement that does not just substitute for a signied or a previous signifier, but rather it emerges as something new. Describing people in cogito-economic terms therefore does not reflect the ‘reality’ of what it means to be a person, but rather it generates and potentially attempts to finalize that reality in a particular way.

We are not suggesting that the metaphor is ‘concrete’ so that it can be traced to its origins, for instance, to get at the true meaning of being a ‘person’. Our point, rather, is that the economic metaphor does work by producing and supplementing. But it does not replace a pre-metaphoric reality where people (subjects) were literal rather than gurative. Nor are we writing nostalgically; there is no turning back from the usure of metaphor. It follows that ‘working knowledge’ cannot be brought into question because it uses gurative language; but it can be questioned in terms of how it uses gurative language.

Scraped again

As we discussed earlier, post-industrial conditions and the so-called ‘information economy’ have further developed the economic metaphor by adding to it a knowledge element. This is a double substitution where an increasingly dominant way of looking at people is as cogito-economic subjects. The creation of the cogito-economic subject is the result of metaphor, but it is a metaphor without literal origin – a subject that cannot transcend its signiers. The debate then turns not to a longing for authentic experience, but to a discussion of the effects of the usure.

This effect is what Derrida describes (metaphorically) as a ‘palimpsest’. Palimpsest comes from the Greek meaning ‘scraped again’, and refers to a parchment, papyrus or other writing material where the original text has been removed so that it can be reused. Before paper became an easily available and inexpensive commodity, this common practice involved old surfaces being scrubbed so that they could be written on multiple times (Murn and Ray 1998). Despite this, even though the original text was scraped off, the older text is still recoverable by the use of means such as ultraviolet light. To consider a word a palimpsest draws attention to the multiple levels of signication that exist in that word. Despite the ‘scrubbing of meaning’ and its metaphorical replacement, a trace of what has been replaced always exists, ‘inscribed in white ink’. This is not to suggest that the meaning that has been replaced was in some way ‘original’ or non-metaphorical. Rather, one sign has been used to designate another in a chain of signification where new signs work to erode, rub out and use up the signs that they replace.

Working knowledge and the cogito-economic subject

Our argument is that contemporary times are seeing the cogito-economic subject emerging through a discourse that uses commercial language to re-write the palimpsest of the self. Indeed, the processes of industrialism have generated dominant discourses on selfhood that both ‘shape the character of the modern self throughout modern industrialism and delimit the context of our thinking on self’ (Casey 1995: 50). It is here that discursive processes of work shape industrial selves through a ‘hidden curriculum’ that produces ‘acculturated employees’(1995: 78). This type of economicself is constructed as desirable in the contemporary work order. Such a self is dened not as an autonomous object, but rather as a subject dened positionally and relationally. The question then changes from: ‘Who denes the terms of the organization to who is dened by them and how these denitions determine organizational identity?’(Baack and Prasch 1997: 136).

The cogito-economic self then exists in a discourse that works to define people in such terms and simultaneously rub out other forms of self, supplementing them with terms that resonate with organizational imperatives. In this way a discourse becomes powerful. When its metaphor is used up, people must contend with the emergent (powerful) discourse in terms of how they define themselves and are defined by others.